competng nterpretatons of the nteracton of domestc monetary polcy and the foregn exchange rate n chna often arse from dfferent assumptons regardng the effectveness of captal controls. At one end of the spectrum s the vew that captal controls merely alter the form of captal flows wthout alterng ther magntude. in ths vew, the heavly managed renmnb exchange rate mples that chna mports ts monetary polcy and lacks control over local short-term nterest rates. At the other end s the vew that captal controls are stll bndng enough to allow the chnese government to set short-term nterest rates, despte the lmted flexblty of the exchange rate. The contrasts between these vews sharpen n the context of growng cross-border flows under the current and captal accounts n the past 10 years as well as the accelerated foregn reserve accumulaton snce 2005. dfferent vews on the status quo also nform the nterpretaton of outcomes for future lberalsaton of captal flows. Agan, at one extreme, ths would unevenly lower transacton costs and thereby alter the mx of cross-border captal flows, but wthout necessarly affectng ther total volume. in ths nterpretaton, captal account lberalsaton mght be of nterest to specalsts n nternatonal finance, but not to those who follow the chnese macroeconomy. At the other extreme, captal account lberalsaton would nfluence the scale and composton of captal flows and ultmately force a choce between exchange rate management and an ndependent monetary polcy.
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competng nterpretatons of the nteracton of domestc monetary polcy and the foregn exchange rate n chna often arse from dfferent assumptons regardng the effectveness of captal controls. At one end of the spectrum s the vew that captal controls merely alter the form of captal flows wthout alterng ther magntude. in ths vew, the heavly managed renmnb exchange rate mples that chna mports ts monetary polcy and lacks control over local short-term nterest rates. At the other end s the vew that captal controls are stll bndng enough to allow the chnese government to set short-term nterest rates, despte the lmted flexblty of the exchange rate. The contrasts between these vews sharpen n the context of growng cross-border flows under the current and captal accounts n the past 10 years as well as the accelerated foregn reserve accumulaton snce 2005. dfferent vews on the status quo also nform the nterpretaton of outcomes for future lberalsaton of captal flows. Agan, at one extreme, ths would unevenly lower transacton costs and thereby alter the mx of cross-border captal flows, but wthout necessarly affectng ther total volume. in ths nterpretaton, captal account lberalsaton mght be of nterest to specalsts n nternatonal finance, but not to those who follow the chnese macroeconomy. At the other extreme, captal account lberalsaton would nfluence the scale and composton of captal flows and ultmately force a choce between exchange rate management and an ndependent monetary polcy.
Ths chapter examnes prce evdence to determne how effectve chna's captal controls have been n the past and how effectve they reman. We focus on the analyss of prce evdence because t provdes the most tellng evdence on the queston (for a dscusson of the flow evdence, see ma and mccauley forthcomng). our basc concluson s that sustaned nterest rate dfferentals mean that chnese captal controls have contnued to bnd. These observed dfferentals cannot, n our vew, be accounted for plausbly by lqudty or credt factors. even the narrowng of these dfferentals snce the unpeggng of the renmnb n July 2005 leaves them at substantal levels. if captal controls stll bte, future lberalsaton s lkely to proceed ncrementally n order to accommodate a shftng balance of exchange rate and financal and monetary stablty objectves.
We define monetary autonomy narrowly n terms of the government's ablty to set short-term domestc nterest rates. such a definton could be approprate to many ndustral countres where monetary polcy has confined tself to settng a short-term nterest rate. in fact, chna's monetary polcy employs a wde varety of other nstruments, ncludng admnstratve controls of depost and mnmum lendng rates as well as quanttatve measures such as reserve requrements, lendng quotas, wndow gudance and restrctons on nvestment. such measures could gve chna's monetary polcy room to manoeuvre even f ts short-term nterest rates were tghtly constraned by the exchange rate polcy. Thus, a findng that short-term nterest rates are not tghtly constraned mples a fortiori monetary ndependence n the broader sense, whch s more relevant n the case of chna.
Growing cross-border flows in China
chna's captal control regme has two mportant features. Frst, captal controls tended to be tghter for cross-border flows thought to be more volatle than for more stable flows. second, the regulatory regme over tme has shfted from one based aganst outflows towards one managng two-way cross-border captal flows n a more balanced fashon. related to the latter s the tendency for polcymakers to systemcally 'lean aganst the wnd' n the sense that control measures on outflows are strengthened to resst deprecaton pressures on the exchange rate and vce versa. Whle such a dscrmnatory control regme could complcate any analyss, more strngent control measures over short-term flows to resst prevalng market pressures would hghlght short-term nterest rates as a useful measure of the efficacy of captal controls.
one factor condtonng the efficacy of captal controls s the sze of external flows. despte contnued captal controls, the past two decades have wtnessed a rapd rse n chna's cross-border flows on the current and captal accounts. As a share of gross domestc product (GdP), chna's gross cross-border flows more than quntupled to more than 120 per cent n 2005, from less than 20 per cent n 1982 (Fgure 14.1), wth a notceable acceleraton n the 1990s. Also, notwthstandng the remarkable expanson of the gross current account flows, chna's captal account flows have been ganng relatve mportance.
1 in 2005, gross captal account flows represented one-thrd of chna's total gross crossborder flows, compared wth just 13 per cent n 1982 and 25 per cent n 1990.
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The backdrop of growng cross-border flows suggests that the chnese economy has become ncreasngly open and ntegrated nto the global economy and s thus more prone to nfluences from global markets than before. in partcular, larger external flows pont to more opportuntes to avod and evade captal controls. Ths n turn rases questons about the efficacy of captal controls, wth mplcatons for monetary autonomy, financal stablty and future captal account lberalsaton. 
Per cent of GDP
Growng trade and financal openness, however, does not support an mmedate concluson about the efficacy of captal controls. in partcular, even large and hghly responsve cross-border flows could lmt wthout guttng captal controls, just as small and stable flows need not mply effectve controls. A more drect and strngent test of captal control effectveness s whether substantal cross-border arbtrage opportuntes persst for a consderable perod. such a test-based not on flows but on onshore and offshore prces-can also ndcate how the effectveness has vared over tme. When prce and flow measures are consstent wth each other, one can arrve at an easy concluson regardng captal moblty; but when they pont n dfferent drectons, prce evdence should be gven more weght. in a departure from the exstng lterature, we examne only the prce measures n gaugng the captal moblty.
Price test of capital mobility: onshore and offshore renminbi yields
The combnaton of onshore renmnb nterest rates, offshore Us dollar rates and non-delverable forward (NdF) exchange rates s analysed next, to test for captal moblty between chna and the offshore financal markets. The null hypothess s that there are no substantal dfferences between renmnb nterest rates onshore, on the one hand, and those mpled by the offshore NdFs n conjuncton wth Us dollar lbor, on the other. 3 The methodology of estmatng such onshore-offshore renmnb yeld gaps s based on ma et al. (2004) , as detaled n the Appendx. The dea s that large and persstent onshore-offshore yeld gaps suggest sgnficant cross-border market segmentaton and thus bndng captal controls; but occasonal small gaps do not necessarly mply neffectveness of captal controls. We nterpret the evdence as supportng the alternatve hypothess of there beng an economcally substantal gap between onshore and offshore renmnb yelds. Acceptance of ths hypothess favours the vew that captal controls n chna have so far remaned substantally bndng. measurng onshore and offshore renmnb yeld dfferentals especally n the case of relatvely less-developed money and foregn exchange markets, nstruments must be chosen carefully to perform ths test. care must be exercsed n the dmensons of maturty, lqudty and credt. ideally, one wants to compare nstruments of dentcal maturty, enjoyng the same lqudty, whch are ssued by the same prvate partes, usually banks. An approprate comparson would be between the yelds on large Us dollar certficates of depost n New York versus yelds on Us dollar deposts posted n london by the top-rated banks that report to the Brtsh Bankers Assocaton (BBA). such a comparson often s based on the three-month maturty that s representatve of domestc and offshore yelds. The banks nvolved n the comparson are qute smlar n ther double-A credt standng. Liquidity considerations. in the case of chna, the challenge has n practce come from gettng a reasonable match between a representatve renmnb money market yeld, on the one hand, and the NdF rate, on the other. in partcular, the nterbank renmnb money market trades wth greatest lqudty at very short maturtes-overnght to seven days-whle the NdF market trades wth greatest lqudty at longer tenors of three months to one year.
Ths chapter mproves on the prevous estmates of onshore-offshore renmnb yeld gaps n the dmenson of lqudty (ma et al. 2004 ). The latter traded off the above consderatons and chose to compare the three-month chna nterbank offered rate (chiBor) yeld to the three-month NdF. 4 Ths comparson stretched to a relatvely long and llqud maturty n the domestc money market, on one hand, and took a relatvely short maturty n the offshore market, on the other. here, we update these earler measures as well as complement the earler analyss wth a new comparson based on a dfferent par of nstruments. in partcular, we also compare the weekly aucton rates for PBc one-year blls avalable snce 2004 wth the one-year NdF. Ths choce compares lqud nstruments n both markets, although t ntroduces possble credt dfferences between the soveregn bll and the bank NdF or depost (see below). lqudty across the two markets matches well at the one-year tenor. The PBc ssued 1.2 trllon renmnb (about Us$150 bllon) of ts one-year blls n 2005 out of a total bll ssuance of 2.8 trllon renmnb, for an average weekly ssuance of about Us$3 bllon equvalent.
5 From January to march 2006, ssuance ranged between 40 and 120 bllon renmnb a week. in the NdF market, the one-year maturty s reportedly the most traded maturty (ma et al. 2004; debelle et al. 2006) .
The less lqud the nstruments that are used for arbtrage of onshore and offshore yelds, the less tellng are observed small yeld dfferences. one can thnk of an arbtrage tunnel nsde of whch further arbtrage transactons are not profitable, gven bd-ask spreads and any tendency for flows of orders to move the market. The upshot s that a findng that captal controls are neffectve could well be consstent wth observed yeld gaps of, say, 25 bass ponts or less. Credit considerations. Wth regard to credt, comparng soveregn and bank yelds on onshore and offshore nstruments, respectvely, s problematc n prncple, but n practce t does not skew the comparson substantally. credt default swaps suggest that the credt standng of chna attracts an nsurance payment of only a handful of bass ponts more than that of the major nternatonal banks that form the Us dollar lbor panel (see Table A14 .2). snce offshore renmnb rates were lower than the onshore PBc bll yeld n the perod 2004-06, the mxng of soveregn and bank credt does wden the estmated yeld gap for ths perod, thus favourng the findng that captal controls are effectve. But as we wll see below, the scale of the estmated yeld dfferences of 100 to 400 bass ponts dwarfs the five bass pont credt dfference.
Wth our earler comparson of chiBor and offshore yelds, credt dfferences tended to reduce the absolute value of the observed yeld dfferentals over much of the sample perod. From 1999 to 2001, hghly rated banks dealng offshore under nternatonal law pad hgher (mpled) yelds than dd domestc chnese banks dealng onshore. Takng nto account the credt dfference would only have wdened the gap. An example of cross-border arbitrage on renminbi interest rates. Before examnng the data, t mght be useful to consder a partcular example of an arbtrage transacton at the one-year tenor by a multnatonal firm wth a profitable operaton n chna. snce september 2003, the offshore speculatve demand to be long n renmnb has gven the treasurer of such a firm a strong ncentve to, n effect, hold renmnb onshore and sell them forward offshore (that s, lendng renmnb onshore and borrowng them offshore). one way of constructng such a poston s for the affilate n chna not to convert renmnb nto dollars n order to remt a dvdend to ts parent outsde chna. instead, the funds are retaned n renmnb and nvested n the chnese money market. The yeld on the one-year depost s proxed by the PBc bll rate (one can thnk of a bank takng the funds n trust and nvestng n the PBc bll). Thus, renmnb funds have been lent onshore.
smultaneously, the affilate borrows dollars at one-year lbor, replacng the cash flow of the unpad dvdend from chna, and sells renmnb one year forward aganst Us dollars, say, to a hedge fund. Ths combnaton of dollar borrowng and forward poston amounts to borrowng renmnb offshore and convertng the proceeds nto dollars, and the rate of nterest pad s (by constructon) the relatvely low NdF-mpled renmnb yeld. At the year's end, the renmnb nvested onshore can be sold for dollars at the then-prevalng spot exchange rate, whch s also used to determne any profit or loss on the NdF, leavng the firm wth the arbtrage gan between the nterest rate n the chnese money market and the lower offshore yeld. Thus, by laggng a current dollar payment-namely, the profit repatraton-the firm has n effect acqured a long renmnb poston and locked n a gan by sellng t offshore.
one of the useful features of ths example s that t shows that arbtrage between the onshore money market and the offshore forward market s not lmted to banks. of course, not all foregn firms operatng n chna are profitable; some have entered jont ventures that constran such arbtrage and not all would be wllng to ncrease ther balance sheet n chna. Nevertheless, such corporate opportuntes are tellng because otherwse a falure to equalse nterest rates could be taken to be merely a symptom of the nefficency of chnese banks. instead, the profit opportuntes present themselves to global companes, whch can be presumed to brng to chna effcent treasury operatons and ndeed the benefit of havng operated wthn and around captal controls n other economes.
onshore-offshore renmnb yeld dfferentals based on three-month chiBor our earler analyss compared a domestc nterest rate-the so-called threemonth chiBor-wth the offshore renmnb rate mpled by three-month NdFs and dollar lbor. We found economcally very sgnficant dfferences. Fgure 14.2 compares the three-month yeld gap for the renmnb wth Asan peers for the perods 1999-2001 and 2002-04. The absolute value of the gap between renmnb yelds onshore and offshore averaged 250-300 bass ponts n the five years to early 2004. Ths placed chna n the mddle of our sample and ndeed s very wde compared wth the onshore-offshore dfferental of 50-100 bass ponts for the korean won n the same perod, and a gap of 20-30 bass ponts observed for the Japanese yen before captal controls were lfted n the early 1980s (otan and Twar 1981). The narrowng of the dfferentals n 2002-04 was n fact less evdent n the case of chna than for most of the other Asan currences.
An updated estmate of the yeld gap for 1999-2006 reveals an even bgger average gap of 310 bass ponts n absolute value and also suggests several dstnct phases of market condtons (Fgure 14.3). in general, f controls bnd, one would expect offshore rates to be above onshore rates when market partcpants are postonng for renmnb weakness and the net drecton of flows of funds s outward. conversely, offshore rates would fall below onshore rates when postonng favours renmnb strength and funds are seekng to enter chna.
in the perod from the east Asan fnancal crss through untl early 2001, the weght of offshore postonng was n the drecton of a weakenng renmnb, resultng n hgher yelds offshore. Then followed a perod of smaller dfferences durng 2001-02, whch saw offshore rates below those onshore, but wth a gap of less than 150 bass ponts. Ths perod featured more balanced postonng on the renmnb. Wth the ntensficaton of publc pressure from Average absolute spread standard devaton of the absolute spread tradng partners on chna's exchange rate polcy n september 2003, however, offshore yelds dropped substantally below ther onshore counterparts. The weght of offshore postonng was n the drecton of a strengthenng renmnb. As chnese companes converted dollar holdngs or borrowngs nto renmnb, reserve growth accelerated, far exceedng the pace that could be explaned by the current account surplus and drect nvestment nflows. The average yeld gap wdened to more than 360 bass ponts from January 2003 to Aprl 2006. The gap reached a peak of 800 bass ponts n md 2005, when the mpled offshore yeld fell well below zero. 6 snce the July 2005 polcy change, however, the yeld gap has narrowed markedly-to less than 200 bass ponts.
The prncpal message based on our prevous and more updated estmates of three-month tenor of the chiBor and renmnb NdF s that the onshoreoffshore gap n the renmnb yelds has been persstently substantal n absolute terms and ts sgn has been consstent wth prevalng market pressures. in other words, htherto, chna's captal controls have prevented sufficent crossborder arbtrage to equalse onshore and offshore short-term yelds. onshore-offshore renmnb yeld dfferentals based on PBc blls
The above findng that offshore renmnb yelds have traded consstently below those onshore n the past two years s confirmed by another test based on a newly avalable and more lqud benchmark money-market yeld n renmnb n chna. As noted above, the ntroducton of a weekly aucton of onshore-offshore yeld gaps snce the July 2005 polcy change how should ths convergence of offshore to onshore renmnb yelds n 2005-06 be nterpreted? it s remarkable that the onshore-offshore nterest dfferental narrowed sharply n the wake of the July 2005 polcy change and remaned qute narrow untl the end of 2006. Those observers wth a pror convcton that captal controls lost effectveness n the presence of growng cross-border flows mght read the reducton of the onshore-offshore renmnb nterest rate dfferental as demonstratng ther convctons. Ths possble nterpretaton s smple. We offer a more nuanced nterpretaton that allows scope for polcy and temporary opportuntes to evade controls.
regardng polcy, we see the ntal narrowng of the onshore and offshore renmnb yeld dfferental as a chosen outcome of polcy rather than as a forced outcome of the weght of money. in the approach to the depeggng, the chnese authortes doubtless apprecated the rsk of a market reacton to any managed ext strategy. in these crcumstances, prudence mght suggest a polcy of not relyng too heavly on captal controls, even f these were judged generally effectve. As t happened, rsng Us nterest rates offered the opton of what mght be termed an opportunstc polcy of uncovered nterest party. Thus, n the months before and after July 2005, chnese authortes wdened the renmnb-dollar nterest gap by reducng the one-year PBc bll rate through polcy rate cuts aganst the backdrop of rsng Us polcy rates. Ths opened up a 3-4 per cent gap between Us dollar and renmnb yelds.
Then after July 2005, the chnese authortes shaped expectatons of a 3-4 per cent annual apprecaton through statements and the actual pace of the spot crawl. indeed, market expectatons seemed to have been remarkably well contaned durng the transton (ma and mccauley forthcomng). The consstency of such exchange rate expectatons and the dollar-renmnb nterest rate dfferental served to keep onshore and offshore renmnb rates not too far out of lne. our nterpretaton suggests that the PBc de facto behaved as though nterest rate party were an operatng target n settng nterest rates and the speed of the crawl, thereby possbly lowerng the rsks nherent n the regme transton. Ths approach reduced relance on the consderable captal controls stll n place, albet to some extent at the cost of relyng more on the non-nterest rate nstruments of monetary polcy. There were also temporary opportuntes to evade the captal controls that arose because of the lag between market development and the artculaton of captal controls. in partcular, the development n 2006 of an onshore forward market mght have added a new channel for nflows that helped to narrow the onshore-offshore dfferental. An onshore renmnb forward market was first ntroduced n late 2005.
7 Ths onshore forward market allowed some players wth a presence n both the onshore and offshore markets to engage n arbtrage. in partcular, such players could buy renmnb forward n the onshore market (at relatvely hgh mpled nterest rates) and smultaneously sell renmnb forward n the offshore market (at relatvely low mpled nterest rates). much lke borrowng renmnb offshore and placng renmnb onshore, such transactons would tend to rase the offshore nterest rates towards domestc nterest rate levels, brngng the onshore and offshore forward curves closer to each other than otherwse. such transactons were apparently made possble by a lacuna n the onshore prudental regulaton of net foregn currency postons for banks, whch set lmts on net spot but not forward postons. in effect, the development of the onshore forward market created a temporary channel for arbtrage, though not one wde enough to rase offshore rates to domestc levels. our nuanced nterpretaton s supported by development snce early 2007, when the onshore-offshore renmnb yeld gaps started wdenng agan to more than 300 bass ponts, puttng captal controls to a stronger test. in our vew, ths latest wdenng has less to do wth the resurgent efficacy of captal controls than wth a partal reversal of the above factors. in response to the nflows related to arbtrage between the offshore and emergng onshore forward markets, chnese authortes have, snce the thrd quarter of 2006, tghtened the rules. measures taken have ncluded an explct prohbton of onshore nsttutons from partcpatng n the offshore NdF market, an ncluson of forward postons n the new prudental regulatons of net bank foregn currency postons and a sharp reducton n the de facto celng on chnese resdents brngng dollars onshore. 8 moreover, snce md 2006, the accelerated pace of spot apprecaton and the larger recorded trade surpluses have condtoned market expectatons of future apprecaton, forcng the mpled offshore yelds to return to zero or even nto negatve terrtory. snce the one-year PBc bll yeld rebounded from a low of 1.5 per cent about md 2005 to 2.8 per cent by late 2006, the onshore-offshore yeld gap wdened further.
in total, the wde dfferences between onshore and offshore renmnb nterest rates pont to the efficacy of captal controls. most recently, the chnese authortes guded domestc nterest rates and expectatons of apprecaton nto broad consstency wth rsng Us dollar nterest rates to reduce the rsks nherent n the ntal exchange rate regme shft. The resultng one percentage pont gap between onshore and offshore renmnb yelds mght have been desred n order to lessen the polcy burden on captal controls, whch have been bndng but not watertght. The experence wth the onshore forwards n 2005-06, however, suggests that mantanng effectve captal controls gets harder wth the development of financal markets and further deregulaton of cross-border transactons. The wder yeld gaps snce early 2007 nevertheless pont to a regme of stll-bndng captal control n chna.
Price measures: tests of uncovered interest parity
The falure of the onshore and offshore renmnb yelds to equalse through cross-border arbtrage ndcates that captal controls bte. Ths n turn ponts to a degree of monetary ndependence n chna. Ths secton addresses ths queston drectly by first assessng the relatonshp between short-term yelds n chna and the Unted states and then by comparng the renmnb-dollar short-term nterest rate gap wth those of the hong kong dollar-Us dollar and euro-Us dollar pars.
interest rate dfferentals n a perod of de facto fixed exchange rates chna and the Unted states went through very dstnct nterest rate cycles between 1996 and 2006, despte the de facto dollar peg of the chnese renmnb untl July 2005. Fgure 14.5 reveals szeable and sustaned, albet varyng, dfferentals between short-term renmnb yelds n chna and the Us dollar yelds n the Unted states and the Unted kngdom. Yeld dfferentals, whether measured n terms of polcy rates or short-term money market rates, have generally been 100 bass ponts or more n absolute value. in sum, experence between the tghtenng of the peg to the dollar n 1997 and ts loosenng n md 2005 suggested that chnese monetary authortes could stll set a somewhat ndependent domestc polcy (even n the face of captal flows responsve to the resultng yeld gap, as shown below). cheung et al. (2003) fit autoregressve models to the short-term nterest rate dfferental between chna and the Unted states and find that …the lagged uncovered nterest dfferental varables are postvely sgnficant and ndcatve of strong persstence…if mones are free to move across markets, arbtrage can generate profits based on the pattern of persstent devaton and help restore the party. however, ths knd of arbtrage actvty s qute dfficult, especally n the short run, gven the prevalng captal controls n the Prc (cheung et al. 2003:11). Another findng of cheung et al. (2003) has been read by echengreen (2004) as ndcatng that the captal controls have become less effectve over tme. in partcular, cheung et al. (2003) report a statstcally sgnficant downward trend n the nterest rate dfferental n the sample perod from January 1996 to may 2002. 9 echengreen's nterpretaton s weakened, however, snce the result depends on data from the early to md 1990s. recall that chna experenced a bout of moderately hgh nflaton-reachng 20 per cent-n 1994-95, trggerng a draconan tghtenng by the authortes. The one-month chnese nterbank rate remaned at double-dgt levels n 1995-97 and remaned at 6-8 per cent throughout 1998. only after the east Asan financal crss had delvered sharp deflatonary shocks to the chnese economy through ts apprecaton of the effectve exchange rate of the renmnb dd chnese polcymakers cut nterest rates repeatedly.
We test the followng three hypotheses: that the Us dollar-renmnb nterest rate dfferental (n absolute terms) s sgnficantly dfferent from zero; that the dfferental has shown a declnng trend; that the average dfferental or ts trend changed durng the sample perod. our tests are based on the three measures of nterest rates n Fgure 14.6 for July 1997 and July 2005 and allow for possble datum breaks wthn ths sample perod. Frst, for the whole sample perod from 1997 to 2005, or for subsamples, the absolute values of the dollar-renmnb nomnal nterest rate dfferentals dffer sgnficantly from zero for all three nterest rate measures. secondly, though t appears from the entre sample perod that the dfferental was trendng downwards, the hypothess of a declnng trend n the dollar-renmnb nterest rate dfferentals s rejected wthn the subsamples.
Fnally, when the data are allowed to determne the most lkely shft pont, the tests reject the null hypothess of no break. in partcular, nducton dentfies a break n the neghbourhood of md 2001-roughly the md pont of the sample perod. Gven ths break, the absolute szes of the nterest rate dfferentals between the renmnb and the Us dollar are narrower for the second half of the sample than for the first half, but reman substantal statstcally. As noted, however, there s lttle evdence of a declnng trend wthn the subsamples, and ndeed we find the wrong sgn for the estmated trend coefficents n all cases.
The econometrc evdence n Table 14 .1 confirms the hypothess of sgnficant renmnb-Us dollar nterest rate dfferentals. Ths s a strong statement that, on average, chna's captal controls have been effectve n mantanng a wedge between nterest rates on the Us dollar and renmnb, despte the de facto dollar peg of the renmnb. our statstcal tests do not support the hypothess of a declnng trend n the nterest rate dfferentals, once a break n the sample s allowed. in partcular, durng 2001-05, when chna deepened ts partcpaton n the global economy consderably and controls were generally relaxed, the estmated trend convergence of short-term nterest rates has the wrong sgn n all of the cases. if closer financal ntegraton forces nterest rate convergence gven exchange rate stablty, t s hard to account for the lack of convergence n more recent years.
Thus, the dstnct nterest rate cycles n chna and the Unted states support the dea that chna's captal controls have bound sufficently to provde polcymakers some degree of short-term monetary autonomy under a de facto dollar peg. 10 We nterpret the observed convergence of polcy rates n the 1990s as owng more to nflaton convergence than to weaker captal controls. rather than happenstance, the nflaton and nterest rate convergence n 1996-2000 can be seen as reflectng the dollar peg's provson of a useful medum-term monetary anchor through prces for traded goods.
11 What matters for the present analyss, however, s that, n the context of low nflaton n both countres, captal controls have permtted chnese nterest rates to dverge from those of the Federal reserve, notwthstandng the exchange rate lnkage. relatve monetary ndependence it mght be argued that the yeld dfferentals just consdered are not wde enough to ndcate monetary ndependence. Ths objecton suggests the usefulness of some benchmarks. how do the dfferentals between the domestc renmnb yelds and Us dollar yelds compare wth those between the hong kong dollar and Us dollar yelds as well as those between the euro and Us dollar yelds? As a small open economy, hong kong has a dollar-based currency board system and no captal controls whatsoever. The euro area, on the other, s a large economy, but one wth a flexble exchange rate and an open captal account. The latter s a much more strngent test than a benchmark based on the Us dollar-hong kong dollar par. Any smlarty n dollar and euro yelds cannot Notes: All dependent varables are expressed n absolute value. T = lnear trend; T 1 (T 2 ) = lnear trend for the first (second) perod; d 1 (d 2 ) = dummy varable for the first (second) perod. Newey-West estmaton on the monthly data for July 1997 and July 2005: accordng to the log lkelhood ratos, the most lkely breakng ponts vary but concentrate around may, June and July 2001, so we mpose a common break pont at June 2001. The Wald Test statstcs are for the jont null hypothess of equal ntercepts and slopes. Numbers n parentheses are t-statstcs: ** ndcates 5 per cent sgnficance; * ndcates 10 per cent sgnficance. Source: Authors' calculatons.
reflect the exchange rate polcy of the euro area (unlke, say, any smlarty n Us dollar and hong kong dollar yelds). The hong kong dollar-Us dollar benchmark hghlghts the efficacy of captal controls n chna, snce hong kong has complete captal moblty but chna has mantaned substantal controls, yet both lnked ther currences tghtly to the Us dollar. As expected, the hong kong dollar-Us dollar yeld pars exhbt much narrower and more stable dfferentals and much hgher correlatons than do the chiBor-lbor pars at one-week and three-month maturtes (Table 14 .2). in partcular, the hbor-lbor correlatons are close to unty, compared wth less than one-thrd for the chiBor-lbor pars. Ths s a classc case of a small open economy choosng a fixed change rate and gvng up ts monetary autonomy, regardless of the respectve busness cycles. hence the hong kong dollar-Us dollar benchmark s hghly advantageous to our argument that chna's captal controls have substantally hndered cross-border arbtrage. one drawback of usng the hong kong dollar-Us dollar benchmark, however, s that t can only suggest that chna's nterest rate settng has more room to manoeuvre than an economy wth very lttle such room.
A more strngent test based on the euro-Us dollar benchmark-where there s a strong presumpton of autonomy n nterest rate settng-stll supports our arguments. it s more strngent because, even wth other thngs beng equal, the sheer sze of the euro area or of chna would secure tself greater autonomy relatve to hong kong. The euro-Us dollar yeld pars have narrower and more stable dfferentals than do the renmnb-Us dollar pars (Table 14. 3). more tellngly, for the perod under consderaton, eurbor and lbor exhbt greater postve co-movements than do the chiBor and lbor. These results hold as well across splt samples. Thus, the evdence from nterbank market yelds suggests that chna-wth a fixed exchange rate and contnued captal controls-does not mport ts nterest rate polcy from the Unted states to any greater extent than the euro area. Ths observaton s consstent wth the vew that captal controls n chna reman bndng.
Conclusion
The analyss n ths chapter fnds that chna's captal controls reman substantally bndng. They prevent the equalsaton of onshore renmnb yelds and those mpled by offshore NdFs. We also find that the observed convergence of short-term nterest rates between chna and the Unted states was more characterstc of the md to late 1990s than of the years snce. Wth ts remanng captal controls, chna's short-term nterest rate settng seems less mported from the Unted states than ether that of hong kong (as a small open economy wth a hard dollar peg) or that of the euro area (as a large economy wth a flexble exchange rate).
The partal convergence of onshore and offshore renmnb yelds durng md 2005 and late 2006 s nterpreted as reflectng the authortes' choce to act as though they were bound by nterest rate party. That s, n the transton from the pegged regme, the chnese authortes found t convenent to take the burden off the captal controls by sgnallng a rate of apprecaton aganst the dollar that was broadly consstent wth the Us dollar-renmnb nterest rate dfferental. We also recognse an element of unntended and temporary relaxaton of captal controls resultng from financal market development gettng ahead of the controls. The latest onshore-offshore gaps have, however, wdened and reman large; and t appears that the authortes are agan testng the effectveness of captal controls.
over tme, financal market development and further lessenng of controls should pave the way for phased ntegraton of chna nto the global market, and wll dmnsh the mportance of the remanng controls. Nevertheless, our findngs of bndng captal controls n chna could also help shed lght on how polcymakers n chna wll pace the country's contnung captal account lberalsaton. our analyss suggests that the choces regardng lberalsaton wll affect more than the form of nflows. 3 For related lterature on captal moblty and controls, see Frankel (1992) and otan and Twar (1981) . captal controls are also dscussed n the contexts of lberalsaton sequence (Frankel 2004; 6 Negatve nomnal nterest rates mpled by the prcng of forward exchange rates are not prma face evdence of an nefficent market. it mght be recalled that, durng the perod of zero yen nterest rates, fractonally negatve nterest rates n yen were mpled by yen-dollar swaps.
What kept the negatve nterest rate only fractonally negatve was foregn banks parkng the yen funds n non-nterest-bearng current accounts at the Bank of Japan. The analogy s mperfect because the negatve nterest rate n yen avalable to foregn banks reflected the credt standng of the Japanese banks and ther need to rase dollars. But the analogy s useful n that t hghlghts the fact that n the chnese case controls prevented non-resdents from obtanng nterest-bearng or even non-nterest-bearng long postons n the renmnb onshore, so some were wllng to pay nterest on long forward postons offshore. 7 in the onshore forward and swap market, the forward rates have been prced prmarly by dfferentals between onshore nterest rates and Us dollar nterest rates and made avalable manly for hedgng for real underlyng transactons. 8 A chnese ndvdual now can brng onshore only a maxmum of Us$50,000 per annum under the current account, down from a prevous de facto celng of Us$300,000. 9 The authors cauton: '[t]here s a subtlety nvolved n usng party condtons to evaluate the level of ntegraton. When a party condton s rejected, then…dmnutons of devatons may be due ether to greater economc ntegraton, greater convergence of economc polces, or both' (p.6). We nclne to polcy convergence. 10 indeed, Granger causalty tests suggest that of the three nterest rate pars shown n Fgure 14.6, none of the causalty runs from the Us rate to the chnese rate. indeed, the null hypothess that the three-month chnese repo yeld does not cause the three-month Us Treasury bll yeld cannot be rejected. Ths runs counter to the general vew that the Unted states s a global nterest rate setter and chna a follower.
11 robert mundell and ron mcknnon have long stressed the mportance of the renmnb's de facto dollar peg as a credble nomnal anchor. it remans, however, an emprcal queston as to how much of the nflaton convergence should be attrbuted to ths anchor as opposed to strong-arm chnese macro controls. The Us Federal reserve tghtened aggressvely from 1994 to md 1995 when the renmnb was first stablsed aganst the Us dollar. in the next three years, the Federal reserve eased somewhat whle former chnese Premer Zhu rongj took forceful measures to control domestc nflaton untl the east Asan financal crss delvered strong deflatonary shocks to the chnese economy.
When captal controls bnd, however, non-resdents mght not have full access to onshore credt or placements, gvng rse to NdFs. NdF = s(1+)/ (1+r  $ ) where '' s the NdF-mpled yeld on the home currency offshore. Note that by definton, '' s not constraned by the zero lower bound and could be substantally negatve. To the extent that the arbtrage between the onshore money market and offshore NdF market s effectvely constraned by captal controls, the NdF-mpled offshore nterest rate, '', can dffer consderably from the nterest rate prevalng n the onshore money market, 'r'. A large and persstent onshore-offshore spread (r -) ndcates the presence of effectve cross-border restrctons. The sgn of the yeld gap could also reveal prevalng market condtons: a postve sgn mples apprecaton pressures on the home currency n the presence of captal controls and vce versa. Whle a persstently bg onshore-offshore yeld gap ndcates market segmentaton, a temporarly narrower gap wll not necessarly suggest less effectve captal controls. one possblty s that market condtons are such that apprecaton or deprecaton pressures on the currency are largely absent so that the estmated yeld gap s relatvely small.
Another, n prncple equvalent, approach s to estmate the mpled onshore yeld on the home currency usng the onshore delverable forwards and then to compare t wth the NdF-mpled offshore yeld. Alternatvely, one could compare the onshore delverable forwards drectly wth ther NdF counterparts to derve a forward premum spread. The merts of these dfferent approaches depend n part on data avalablty and market lqudty. in chna's case, these alternatve measures could become more useful over tme, as the relevant onshore markets develop and data become more avalable. 
